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RESOLVING PRE-RECEIVERSHIP CLAIMS AGAINST
FAILED SAVINGS AND LOANS: AN
UNNECESSARILY EXHAUSTING
EXPERIENCE
DEIRDRE M. ROARTY
INTRODUCrION
In 1988, Davey Developer borrowed funds from the Risky Business
Savings Association to finance his new project, the Hundred Acre
Woods Housing Development. The Hundred Acre Woods was devel-
oped according to a master plan' and each deed contained a series of
covenants and restrictions on the lots. The restrictions required Da-
vey Developer to provide certain amenities such as a sewer system
and a community golf course. Prior to completing his obligations
under the covenants, Davey Developer experienced financial difficul-
ties and was no longer able to make payments to Risky Business on
his loan. As a result, Risky Business foreclosed on the unsold lots of
Hundred Acre Woods, and Davey and Hundred Acre Woods filed for
bankruptcy.
Risky Business subsequently acquired title to the unsold lots during
the bankruptcy auction. When Risky Business failed to fulfill the cov-
enants under the master plan restrictions, one of the land owners,
Christopher Robin,2 brought suit in state court against the savings as-
sociation for damages or, in the alternative, for injunctive relief to en-
force the covenants.
Risky Business, meanwhile, experienced some financial difficulties
of its own.3 In response, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("O"I3) 4
1. Davey Developer created the master plan and imposed the restrictions on the
property. The deed to each lot contained the covenants placed on the property, and
each purchaser was aware that all lots were to be developed according to these
restrictions.
2. Like Christopher Robin, who explored the Hundred Acre Woods in A. A.
Milne's children's classic Winnie-The-Pooh, our Robin is about to enter into an "im-
penetrable thicket... a veritable jungle of linguistic fronds and brambles." Marquis
v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1992). Unfortunately for Robin, he probably
will not find such amiable playmates as Pooh and Eeyore during his adventure in
litigation with the RTC. See A. A. Milne, Winnie-the-Pooh (1926).
3. For example, Risky Business may have taken advantage of changes in the
banking law that allowed savings associations to lend to commercial real estate devel-
opers, thus changing their principal business from home mortgage lending to commer-
cial real estate financing. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (setting forth
the regulations and limitations governing the operations of federally insured thrift
associations); see also Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 Fordham L
Rev. s7, s32 (1991) (commenting on the changes in thrift regulation in the early
1980s). Professor Felsenfeld wrote:
[In 1982], Congress gave the federal S&Ls powers enabling them to engage
in activities well beyond their basic and traditional business of making resi-
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appointed the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") 5 conservator 6
for Risky Business. Even under the guidance of the RTC, Risky Busi-
ness continued its downward slide. Two months later, because Risky
Business was unable to meet its obligations to its depositors, the RTC
was appointed receiver.7 The RTC assumed all of Risky Business' as-
sets and liabilities, including Robin's lawsuit against Risky Business.8
As part of its duties as receiver, the RTC substituted itself as de-
fendant in all lawsuits brought against Risky Business.9 Pursuant to
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 ("FIRREA"), 10 the RTC sent Robin notice of its appointment
and the cut-off date for submission of claims for RTC review." Robin
did not file his claim with the RTC, because he believed that his pend-
ing lawsuit against Risky Business provided the RTC with sufficient
notice of the claim. Three months after the cut-off date, the RTC
agreed to accept an amended service of process and filed various pre-
dential real estate mortgage loans. Essentially, they were becoming more
like banks. The powers granted by Congress in 1980 included authorization
to make loans, up to twenty percent of their assets, on the security of first
liens on commercial real estate .... In 1982 the new powers were expanded.
The most noteworthy were the authorization to make secured commercial
loans up to forty percent of assets, and to make unsecured commercial loans
up to [10%] of assets.
Id. at s33. Thus, Congress attempted to meet the needs of the thrift industry by al-
lowing savings and loans to diversify their loan portfolios.
Unfortunately, many high risk applicants who ought to have been rejected were
approved for commercial loans. See id. at s33-34. When the real estate market col-
lapsed in the late 1980s, many of Risky Business' commercial borrowers defaulted on
their loans. Risky Business, which foreclosed on, and then acquired title to, many of
these properties, quickly became financially unstable because, while it held a massive
amount of property, little cash was coming in to replenish the amounts necessary to
cover obligations to depositors.
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(a) (Supp. V 1993) (establishing the OTS).
5. See Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 369 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b) (Supp.
V 1993)) (creating the Resolution Trust Corporation as an agency of the U.S. govern-
ment to act as conservator and receiver for insured depository institutions).
6. A conservator is appointed to handle the day-to-day operations of a savings
and loan. The RTC or FDIC may take whatever actions are necessary to make the
savings and loan solvent and to conserve assets. See Barry S. Zisman, Banks &
Thrifts: Government Enforcement and Receivership § 15.06 (6)(d) (1994).
7. A receiver is appointed to liquidate the assets and to resolve the affairs of a
failed savings and loan. See id. § 15.07(2).
8. This hypothetical is based loosely upon the facts of Brady Dev. Co. v. RTC, 14
F.3d 998 (4th Cir. 1994).
9. Under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the RTC may
intervene as a matter of right in actions involving a failed savings and loan for which it
was appointed receiver. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Furthermore, under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(l)(2) (Supp. V 1993), the RTC may be substituted as a party in all actions in
which the savings and loan was a party.
10. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 &
15 U.S.C.).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring the RTC to notify claim-
ants by either mail or publication of its appointment as receiver and the date by which
claimants must submit proof of their claims for administrative review by the RTC).
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trial motions in the lawsuit. The RTC agreed to this despite the fact
that its current interpretation of FIRREA would bar Robin from as-
serting his claim, either administratively or judicially, due to his failure
to submit his claim before the cut-off date. One year later, the RTC
filed a motion to dismiss, stating that under FIRREA the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over claims against a failed savings and
loan when such claims had not first been submitted to the RTC for
administrative review.
The scenario described above is a common one, and it raises a juris-
dictional question unique to litigation in which either the RTC or the
Federal Depository Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") acts as receiver.
Recently, the circuit courts have split on whether FIRREA requires a
pre-receivership claimant-someone in Robin's position-to exhaust
administrative remedies' 2 before continuing a claim in court. Under
the RTC's interpretation, Robin is required to exhaust administrative
remedies before a court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction. If he
need not exhaust administrative remedies, as the Fifth Circuit has
held, then he may continue in court, and the court may find that the
RTC waived its right to an administrative remedy. The majority of
courts have agreed with the RTC and concluded that because FIR-
REA permits the RTC to determine claims against it administratively,
claimants must submit to the administrative process before courts can
exercise subject matter jurisdiction.13 The Fifth Circuit, however, has
concluded that Congress merely provided the RTC with the option of
determining claims administratively, and did not divest courts of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over pre-receivership claims. 4 This Note con-
cludes that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of FIRREA's limitations
on subject matter jurisdiction is most consistent with the intent of
Congress.
12. Exhaustion of administrative remedies requires a claimant to file a claim and a
submission of proof with the RTC within a specified period of time prior to filing the
claim in court. The claimant then must wait for the RTC to decide whether it will
honor the claim. The claimant then may request agency review of an adverse deci-
sion, or may seek a judicial resolution of the claim. Id § (d)(3)(B), (d)(5)-(d)(7).
13. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 39 F.3d 292, 295
(11th Cir. 1994); Brady Dev. Co. v. RTC, 14 F.3d 998, 1005-06 (4th Cir. 1994);
Bueford v. RTC, 991 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1993); Henderson v. Bank of New Eng-
land, 986 F.2d 319, 320-21 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 114 S.Ct. 559 (1993); Marquis v.
FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1151-52 (1st Cir. 1992); RTC v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624, 627 (2d
Cir. 1991); RTC v. Mustang Partners, 946 F.2d 103, 106 (10th Cir. 1991); Rosa v. RTC,
938 F.2d 383, 391 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 112 S.Ct. 582 (1991).
14. See Whatley v. RTC, 32 F.3d 905, 908 (5th Cir. 1994). But cf Carney v. RTC,
19 F.3d 950, 958 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is
required in actions for non-monetary relief).
The Whatley decision does not distinguish the type of relief sought in determining
whether the statute requires exhaustion. This is the better approach because other
sections of FIRREA explicitly prohibit courts from granting injunctive relief to claim-
ants. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) (Supp. V 1993). Consequently, the type of relief sought
should not be a consideration in determining subject matter jurisdiction.
1995] 2317
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Part I of this Note introduces the sections of FIRREA that are the
source of the exhaustion requirement controversy. This part first
presents a brief history of savings and loan regulation. This part then
examines the powers given to the RTC under FIRREA in its role as
receiver. Finally, this part discusses the administrative claims process
and the exhaustion requirement prior to the enactment of FIRREA.
Part II discusses whether FIRREA, generally, provides for different
treatment of pre- and post-receivership claims. This part reviews sev-
eral cases that are representative of the analysis that both the RTC
and a majority of courts used to determine that FIRREA does not
allow pre-receivership claimants to proceed directly to judicial deter-
mination of their claims. Part II then discusses the decision in Whatley
v. RTC,'5 in which the Fifth Circuit held that FIRREA does not re-
quire pre-receivership claimants to exhaust administrative remedies
because the statute differentiates between pre- and post-receivership
claims.' 6 This part concludes that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation is
correct and that FIRREA does create a dichotomy between pre- and
post-receivership claimants. Part III offers an alternative analysis for
determining that FIRREA does not require pre-receivership claim-
ants to exhaust administrative remedies. This part examines the con-
flicting views on whether the RTC may waive its right to determine
claims administratively. If the RTC's right to administrative review is
waivable, the RTC may not assert a court's lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction over a plaintiff's claim when the RTC causes a plaintiff to
fail to exhaust the administrative process. This part concludes that
because FIRREA does not vest exclusive or primary jurisdiction in
the administrative processes, the RTC's right to administrative review
of claims is waivable. This Note concludes that FIRREA does not
require pre-receivership claimants to exhaust administrative remedies
to preserve a court's subject matter jurisdiction, but rather, the RTC
must act affirmatively to delay judicial proceedings in favor of the ad-
ministrative process.
In March, the RTC announced that it had sold the last group of
savings and loan associations under its control.17 Because the RTC is
statutorily prohibited from accepting new savings and loans into its
receivership program after July 1, 1995,18 the agency is expected to
quietly disappear within the next few months. The FDIC, however,
will continue to act as receiver for all failed depository institutions.
Although this Note focuses on those cases involving the RTC as re-
15. 32 F.3d 905 (5th Cir. 1994).
16. Id at 910; see infra notes 156-72 and accompanying text.
17. Jack Mazzeo, Thrift Agency Sells Last Group of S&Ls Under Its Control, Wall
St. J., March 14, 1995, at B12.
18. Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act, Pub. L. No. 103-204, 107 Stat.
2369 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a (Supp. V 1993)).
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ceiver, the conclusions reached are equally applicable to lawsuits in-
volving the FDIC.19
I. RTC AS RECEIVER
FIRREA represents the government's most ambitious attempt to
regulate the commercial banking and thrift20 industries since the
1930s. As the complex and painstakingly detailed nature of § 1821(d)
demonstrates, Congress was attempting to address every potential
problem the RTC or FDIC might encounter while resolving failed fi-
nancial institutions. This part concludes, however, that the language
of § 1821(d) shows that Congress did not take the opportunity when
drafting FIRREA to make exhaustion a statutory requirement.
Therefore, the courts must decide whether § 1821(d), which sets forth
the claims process and the limitations on judicial review of claims,21
implies an exhaustion requirement.
A. History of the RTC's Powers
At the time of the Great Depression, the primary business of sav-
ings and loans was providing financing to individual borrowers seek-
ing to purchase homes 2 When many of these borrowers lost the
ability to repay their loans,' the savings and loans were faced wvith
serious cash flow deficiencies, which led to an inability to meet their
own obligations.24 At the same time, commercial banks sought repay-
ment of funds that had been lent to the savings and loans.35 As a
19. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) applies to both the RTC and the FDIC See id.
§ 1441a(b)(8) (Supp. V 1993).
20. The term "thrift" is a generic term for a savings bank or savings and loan
association. The term will be used interchangeably with the term "savings and loan"
for the purposes of this Note.
21. Section 1821(d) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he claimant may request administrative review of the claim ... or file suit
on such claim (or continue an action commenced before the appointment of
the receiver) in the district or territorial court of the United States for the
district within which the depository institution's principal place of business is
located or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (and
such court shall have jurisdiction to hear such claim).
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
Section 1821(d)(13)(D) further states that, except as otherwise provided, "no court
shall have jurisdiction over-(i) any claim or action... seeking a determination of
rights with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the Corpora-
tion has been appointed receiver." Id. § 1821(d)(13)(D).
22. Wayne M. Josel, Note, The Resolution Trust Corporation: Waste Management
and the S&L Crisis, 59 Fordham L. Rev. s339, s340 (1991).
23. See Felsenfeld, supra note 3, at s7.
24. See Lucia J. Mandarino, Note, Too Many Consonants and Not Enough Conso-
nance: The Development of the S&L Regulatory Framework, 59 Fordham L Rev.
s263, s267 (1991).
25. Felsenfeld, supra note 3, at s8. "In order to reverse this trend, S&Ls were
forced to offer higher rates of interest on deposits than they were receiving on mort-
gage payments." Id. The savings and loans began to borrow from commercial banks to
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result, many savings and loans became insolvent,26 and by 1932, the
industry was on the verge of complete collapse.27 In response to this
crisis, the federal government passed a host of regulatory measures
designed to prevent the thrift industry from collapsing, as well as to
renew consumer confidence in American business and industry.28
In 1932, Congress enacted the Federal Home Loan Bank Act("FHLBA"), creating the federal savings and loan system.2 One of
the purposes of the FHLBA was to lend money to savings and loans
and other mortgage lenders, thereby restoring much needed liquidity
to the thrift industry.30 Congress also created the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board to oversee the operations of the branch banks.31
The Bank Board's powers under the Home Owners' Loan Act of
1933 ("HOLA") 32 included the general ability to "prescribe rules and
regulations for the organization, consolidation, merger or liquidation"
of federal savings and loan associations. 33 Among the specific powers
granted to the Bank Board was the power to appoint receivers for
troubled thrifts. In 1934, Congress passed legislation creating the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") to act as,
among other things, the chief receiver under the direction of the Bank
Board. 4
These entities successfully supported the thrift industry for the next
forty-five years.35 In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, how-
ever, the savings and loan industry experienced a major period of cri-
cover depositor withdrawals. These loans were to be repaid from incoming receipts.
After the Stock Market Crash of 1929, commercial banks found themselves short of
cash and called the loans to the savings and loans. Mandarino, supra note 24, at s267.
26. Felsenfeld, supra note 3, at s8 ("When the banks called the loans, they thereby
reduced the liquidity of the S&Ls, and, consequently, the S&Ls ability to lend and
finance."). This liquidation of the savings and loans caused depositors to panic and
eventually caused a "run" on deposits. This led to a crisis in both the commercial
banking and savings and loan industries. Mandarino, supra note 24, at s267.
27. See Felsenfeld, supra note 3, at s7; Mandarino, supra note 24, at s267.
28. Felsenfeld, supra note 3, at s8; Marjorie I. Stein, Note, Resolution Trust Corpo-
ration, 13 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 57, 57 (1994) (noting that in the 1930s, because of the
failure of a large number of thrifts and lack of consumer confidence, Congress passed
legislation to strengthen and regulate savings and loans).
29. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 304, Ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932)(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see Felsen-
feld, supra note 3, at s8; Zisman, supra note 6, § 15.04.
30. See Zisman, supra note 6, § 15.04.
31. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 304, Ch. 522, § 17, 47 Stat. 725,
736-37; see Zisman, supra note 6, § 15.04.
32. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 43, Ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (codified
as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
33. Zisman, supra note 6, § 15.04.
34. See National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 479, Ch. 847, § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1246,
1256 (1934) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730i (1988) (repealed Pub. L. No. 101-73,
§ 401(a), 103 Stat. 354-63 (1989)) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. V 1993))).
35. Felsenfeld, supra note 3, at s8.
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sis. 36 During the 1980s almost two thirds of the nation's thrift
institutions failed or merged because of insolvency.37 There were sev-
eral causes for this second crisis: the economic stagnation of the late
1970s, the deregulation of the 1980s, and widespread mismanagement
and fraud.3 1 In 1989, the federal government passed legislation in re-
sponse to the savings and loan crisis-Congress enacted FEREA39 to
address the growing problems of the thrift industry, which prior legis-
lation seemed incapable of resolving.
FIRREA created the OTS to replace the Bank Board ° The OTS
was to act as the "primary federal regulator of all federal and state
savings associations."'" FIRREA also formally dissolved the
FSLIC,4 2 which was insolvent by the time this new legislation was en-
acted.43 The RTC assumed the FSLIC's role as receiver for failed
savings and loans. 4
Because of the large number of failed thrifts, FIRREA also created
the RTC as a temporary agency to resolve the bulk of the savings and
loan associations in receivership. 45 Congress charged the agency with
the task of resolving the savings and loan crisis in the most efficient
and cost-effective manner possible.6 To accomplish this task, the
RTC takes over insolvent thrifts, selling the thrift's assets so that it
then may distribute the proceeds to creditors and shareholders.47
The RTC is under the general supervision of the FDIC,' and was
originally scheduled to dissolve on August 9, 1992.49 Due to the con-
tinuing problems within the thrift industry, as well as internal turmoil
36. Id. (noting that after 45 years of success, from the 1930s through the 1970s, the
savings and loan industry collapsed and is "the dominant financial disaster of our-
and perhaps any-time").
37. Id. at s20 (noting that by the early 1980s large losses replaced earnings, as the
savings and loan industry's return on assets averaged -0.42% from 1980-82).
38. See id. at s38-49; Josel, supra note 22, at s340-42; Stein, supra note 28, at 58.
39. See Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of
12 & 15 U.S.C.).
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(a) (Supp. V 1993); see Pub. L No. 101-73, § 401(a)(2), 103
Stat. 354 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. V 1993)) (abolishing the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board).
41. Vickie 0. Tucker et at, The RTC: A Practical Guide to the Receivership/Con-
servatorship Process and the Resolution of Failed Thrifts, 25 U. Rich. L Rev 1, 3
(1990); see 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(a).
42. See Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 401(a), 103 Stat. 183, 354 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1437 (Supp. V 1993)).
43. Josel, supra note 22, at s341-42 ("By the end of 1988, the General Accounting
Office, Congress' investigatory agency, estimated that the FSLIC was insolvent by at
least $56 billion.").
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. V. 1993).
45. Icker, supra note 41, at 4; see 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3); Stein, supra note 28, at
59.
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C) (Supp. V 1993); see also Josel, supra note 22, at
s345-47 (discussing the process of resolving failed thrifts).
47. Stein, supra note 28, at 59.
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(8) (Supp. V 1993); Tcker, supra note 41, at 4.
49. See Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 501a(b)(3)(iii), 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
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at the RTC,50 however, Congress extended the term of the RTC until
July 1, 1995,51 at which time the FDIC is to resume responsibility for
resolving the affairs of any savings and loan associations still in
receivership.52
B. The Receivership Process and The RTC's Power
Under FIRREA
The OTS has the exclusive power under FIRREA to appoint con-
servators and receivers for federal savings and loan associations. 3
The OTS may appoint a receiver without giving notice to the associa-
tion, if any of the following conditions, among others, exist: the assets
are less than obligations to creditors; there has been a substantial dis-
sipation of assets or earnings due to violations of law or regulations, or
to any unsafe or unsound business practice; the association is operat-
ing in an unsafe or unsound business condition, including having insuf-
ficient capital; or, the association is not likely to be able to pay its
obligations or meet the demands of its depositors. 4
A receiver is appointed to liquidate the assets and to resolve the
affairs of a failed savings and loan.5 FIRREA empowers the RTC to
act as a receiver for failed savings and loan associations by allowing
the RTC to exercise the powers available to the FDIC under the Fed-
eral Depository Insurance Act.56 The RTC succeeds to all rights, ti-
50. While the RTC has now resolved all of the depository institutions in its receiv-
ership program, see Mazzeo, supra note 17 and accompanying text, the agency has
been the subject of much criticism and some scandal. There have been serious allega-
tions that waste and mismanagement within the agency have led to the extraordinary
cost and delay in resolving the S&L crisis. For example, in 1993 it was reported that
the RTC failed to properly monitor temporary workers from Price Waterhouse, which
was under contract to audit Home Federal Savings, a failed S&L in San Diego. The
RTC allegedly paid 67¢ per photocopy and paid the temporary workers $35 per hour.
The average cost of photocopying was 12-15g per page, and RTC officials alleged that
Price Waterhouse was billed only half of what it charged the RTC for the temporary
labor. John Connor, Price Waterhouse Copying Charges Stir RTC Review, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 16, 1993, at BllA. In addition, for most of 1992 and 1993, the RTC received no
federal funding. This lack of funding hampered its ability to sell the assets in its port-
folio and resolve the remaining thrifts. Stein, supra note 28, at 59.
51. Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act, Pub. L. No. 103-204, § 7(b),
107 Stat. 2369 (1993) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(m)(1) (Supp. V 1993)).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(m)(1).
53. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993). For an in-depth discussion of the
claims resolution process, see Tucker, supra note 41.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1993); id. § 1821(c)(5).
55. Id § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii); Tucker, supra note 41, at 24.
56. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993). The statute provides:
Except as provided in paragraph (5) and in addition to any other provision
of this section, the [RTC] shall have the same powers and rights to carry out
its duties with respect to the institutions described in paragraph (3)(A) as
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has under sections 1821, 1822
and 1823 of this title [the Federal Deposit Insurance Act] with respect to
insured depository institutions.
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ties, powers, and privileges of the association 57 and takes possession of
the association's assets subject to all rights, equities, liens, and encum-
brances that existed prior to its appointment.58 In other words, the
receiver is said to stand in the shoes of the insolvent thrift and may
assert all of the rights of that entity.59
Among the specific powers of the RTC as receiver are the follow-
ing: to merge or transfer assets and liabilities;' to obtain a stay in
judicial proceedings; 61 to litigate any appealable judgment in place of
the association with all of the rights available to the association and
the additional rights available to the RTC-including the right to re-
move litigation to federal court;62 the right to evaluate claims of credi-
tors of failed savings and loans;63 and, the right to liquidate the assets
of the thrift and distribute the proceeds to creditors and sharehold-
ers. 6 The powers at issue in this Note's analysis of the exhaustion
question are the right of the RTC to obtain a stay, to litigate in place
of the insolvent thrift and the right to evaluate claims against the
failed savings and loan.
C. Claims Procedure
Even before the passage of FIRREA, courts questioned whether a
plaintiff's exhaustion of administrative remedies was a condition pre-
cedent to their exercising subject matter jurisdiction. Prior to the en-
actment of FIRREA, the FSLIC claimed that it had exclusive
authority under the banking laws to adjudicate claims against thrifts in
receivership. 65 There are two pre-FIRREA cases addressing this is-
sue: the first, a circuit court decision upholding the exhaustion re-
quirement; the second, a Supreme Court decision rejecting the
administrative exhaustion requirement. While Congress addressed
some of the Court's concerns regarding the adequacy of the adminis-
trative procedures when drafting FIRREA, Congress did not use that
opportunity to make exhaustion a statutory requirement.
In 1985, the Fifth Circuit held, in North Mississippi Savings and
Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth,6" that trial courts lacked subject matter juris-
Id Thus, although § 1821 specifically refers only to the FDIC, the RTC acts under the
provisions of the statute as well.
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
58. See id. § 1821(d)(2)(B) (empowering the RTC to take control of the assets and
operations of failed savings and loans).
59. See Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 571 (1989).
60. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G) (Supp. V 1993).
61. Id. § 1821(d)(12)(A).
62. Id. § 1821(d)(13)(B).
63. Id § 1821(d)(3)(A).
64. Id § 1821(d)(2)(E).
65. See Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 572 (1989); North Mis-
sissippi Say. and Loan v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985).
66. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985).
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diction over claims against failed savings and loans.67 Changes in Mis-
sissippi's banking laws forced the savings association involved to
obtain FSLIC insurance.' The FSLIC refused to insure the thrift un-
less Hudspeth, the thrift's president, was replaced. 69 Hudspeth
stepped down, and the savings association began making regular
monthly payments-termed "deferred compensation"-to him." Af-
ter paying Hudspeth for almost five years, North Mississippi Federal
Savings and Loan filed an action in state chancery court for a declara-
tion that the contract either did not exist or was terminable.71 One
year after North Mississippi filed its action, the Bank Board named
the FSLIC receiver for North Mississippi.7" The FSLIC removed the
action to federal court where its motion for dismissal was granted.73
The court in Hudspeth held that once North Mississippi was placed
in receivership, "all of Hudspeth's claims [were] switched to the
administrative track by § 1464(d)(6)(C)." 74  According to
§ 1464(d)(6)(C), "[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this subsection,
no court may... except at the instance of the Board, restrain or affect
the exercise of powers or functions of a conservator or receiver."' In
reaching its decision, the court accepted the FSLIC's contention that
"resolution of even the facial merits of claims outside of the statutory
reorganization process would delay the receivership function of distri-
bution of assets."76 The court found that such a delay would amount
to a restraint in violation of § 1464(d)(6)(C), and therefore, the lower
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.77 According to
the court, the viability of claims against failed thrifts was to be deter-
mined first through the administrative claims process, subject only
later to judicial review.7"
By 1988, the Bank Board had established an elaborate set of proce-
dures for determining creditor claims.79 These procedures required
the FSLIC to notify potential claimants of their right to file a proof of
claim within a specified period of time after receipt of notice. 0 After
the claim had been properly filed, it was assigned to a Special Repre-
sentative who was required, within six months of the receipt of the
proof of claim, to notify each claimant of whether the claim would be
67. Id
68. Id at 1099.
69. ld
70. Id
71. Id
72. Id
73. Id at 1100.
74. Id at 1103.
75. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1988).
76. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102.
77. Id
78. Id at 1103.
79. Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 580 (1989).
80. 12 C.F.R. 575.3-.4 (1989).
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allowed in full, in part, disallowed or held for further review.81 The
procedures placed no limit on the period of time that claims could be
held for further review.s2 If the FSLIC disallowed a claim, the claim-
ant could request review by the Bank Board.s The procedures also
stated that judicial review of any decision was available only after ex-
haustion of the procedures and review by the Bank Board. s
In Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC,s5 the Supreme Court
rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Hudspeth and held that claim-
ants were not required to exhaust administrative remedies. Between
1983 and 1986, the claimants in Coit borrowed money from First-
South, F.A., a federal savings and loan.' In 1986, they filed a state
law complaint against FirstSouth, alleging that because of a "profit
participation" condition placed on the loans, the loans were usurious
under Texas law.87 Two months after Coit filed the claim, the FSLIC
was appointed receiver for FirstSouth.ss When the FSLIC removed to
federal court, the district court, relying on Hudspeth, dismissed the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the claimants failed
to exhaust the administrative claims process.89
The Supreme Court reversed, however, reasoning that although
"Congress [had] granted [the] FSLIC various powers in its capacity as
receiver,... [they did] not include the power to adjudicate creditors'
claims."90 The Court rejected the reasoning of the Hudspeth decision
for several reasons. First, the Court reasoned that § 1464(d)(6)(C) 9'
did not add adjudication of claims to the FSLIC's powers, it merely
prohibited courts from interfering with powers granted in other sec-
tions of the statute. 2 According to the Court, neither 12 U.S.C.
§ 1729(d)9 3-which gives the FSLIC the power to settle, compromise,
or release claims in favor of or against a failed savings and loan-nor
§ 1729(b)gn-requiring the FSLIC to pay all valid obligations of the
81. Id. at 575.9-.11.
82. Id at 575.12.
83. Id at 575.13(o).
84. Id. at 575.1(a).
85. Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); see Tcker, supra
note 41, at 34-38 (providing an in-depth discussion of the Colt decision).
86. Coit, 489 U.S. at 565.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id at 565-66.
90. Id- at 572.
91. The language of the statute provides, "Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, no court may take any action for or toward the removal of any conserva-
tor or receiver, or, except at the instance of the [Bank] Board, restrain or affect the
exercise of powers or functions or a conservator or receiver." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(6)(C) (1988).
92. Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 574 (1989).
93. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1988).
94. Id § 1729(b)(1)(B).
1995] 2325
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
association-grant the FSLIC adjudicatory power.95 Rather, the
court held that these sections allow the FSLIC topay claims proven to
its satisfaction, much like an insurance company.' Second, the Court
found that § 1464(d)(6)(A), when examined in its statutory context,
does not apply to creditor claims against a thrift under FSLIC receiv-
ership.97 According to the Court, this provision was intended to pro-
hibit only untimely challenges to the appointment of a receiver or
other actions attempting to restrain the receiver in its basic func-
tions.98 Finally, the Court noted that the Hudspeth decision failed to
explain why the delay caused in waiting for a judicial determination of
the claim would be any more of a restraint than would judicial review
of an FSLIC administrative ruling. 9 The Court in Coit went on to
address the FSLIC's contention that the "'Bank Board and FSLIC
plainly do have [the] power to require claimants first to present their
claims to [the] FSLIC, and exhaust the administrative process'
before suing in court.100 The Court found that the claimant was not
required to exhaust administrative remedies because the procedures
established by the Bank Board were inadequate in that they failed to
protect the fights of claimants.' 0 '
According to the Court, the process established by the Bank Board
was unfair to claimants."° It allowed the FSLIC to delay the process-
ing of claims indefinitely, denying litigants their day in court by delay-
ing until the statute of limitations had run. 0 3 Furthermore, the
process enabled the FSLIC to coerce claimants into accepting unfair
settlements out of fear that by the time a court made a determination
on the claim, the receiver's assets might have been depleted by settle-
ments with other claimants.' °4 Consequently, the Court concluded
that claimants could not be required to exhaust administrative reme-
dies before proceeding in court.10 5
Furthermore, the Court found that the FSLIC's administrative pro-
cedures exceeded the Bank Board's authority. 0 6 The regulations at-
tempted to confer adjudicatory authority to the FSLIC and the Bank
Board to make binding conclusions of law, subject only to judicial re-
view as opposed to de novo determination of the merits. 7 Moreover,
the procedures failed to establish a reasonable time limit on the
95. Coit, 489 U.S. at 573.
96. Id
97. Id at 575.
98. Id
99. Id at 577.
100. Id at 579 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 20 & n.13).
101. Il at 587.
102. lId
103. It
104. It
105. Id
106. See id.
107. See id.
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FSLIC's consideration of claims, particularly those held for "further
review."108
The Coit decision, issued in March 1989, clearly impacted Congress'
subsequent drafting of FIRREA.1 9 For example, FIIRREA denies
the RTC full adjudicatory authority." 0 The statute permits the RTC
to make findings of fact for its own determination of whether to allow
or disallow claims."' Because FIRREA explicitly prohibits a court
from reviewing the RTC's determination to disallow a claim, however,
FIRREA also ensures a claimant's right to a de novo judicial determi-
nation.112 Furthermore, unlike the prior procedures, which permitted
the FDIC to hold a claim indefinitely, FIRREA requires the RTC to
make a determination within 180 days from the date a claim is filed. 113
As is clear from the continuing litigation, however, FIRREA did
not resolve all of the questions concerning the exhaustion requirement
and pre-receivership claims against failed thrifts. Most importantly,
FIRREA does not answer the threshold question of whether all claim-
ants are required to resort to administrative procedures prior to seek-
ing a judicial resolution of their claim. Congress could have taken the
opportunity to make exhaustion of administrative remedies a condi-
tion precedent to vesting a court with subject matter jurisdiction, but
it did not. Therefore, courts must determine whether FIRREA im-
plies an exhaustion requirement.
D. Introduction to § 1821(d) of FIRREA
The RTC contends that a claimant's failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies results in disallowance of the claim by the RTC and pre-
vents all courts from properly asserting subject matter jurisdiction
over the claim." 4 This interpretation has been adopted by the major-
ity of courts and commentators." 5 Under this view, a claimant who
has previously filed a lawsuit must take additional measures to secure
the right to judicial review after the RTC has been appointed receiver.
108. Id. at 586-87.
109. See Circle Indus. v. City Fed. Say. Bank, 749 F. Supp. 447, 453-54 (E.D.N.Y.
1990), aff'd, 931 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1991).
110. Tucker, supra note 41, at 37.
111. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(D) (Supp. V 1993).
112. Id. § 1821(d)(5)(E).
113. Id. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i).
114. E.g., Brady Dev. Co. v. RTC, 14 F.3d 998, 1002 (4th Cir. 1994) (arguing that
the plaintiffs' failure to avail themselves of the administrative processes required by
FIRREA prohibited the district court from adjudicating the claim).
115. See id. at 1005; Bueford v. RTC, 991 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1993); RTC v.
Mustang Partners, 946 F.2d 103, 106 (10th Cir. 1991); Chism v. RTC, 783 F. Supp. 361,
362 (N.D. 111. 1991); Decrosta v. Red Carpet Inns Int'l, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 694, 696
(E.D. Pa. 1991); Jeffery S. Rosenblum, The RTC's Quest for Exclusive Federal Court
Jurisdiction Under FIRREA, 24 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 725, 729 (1994); Zisman, supra,
note 6, § 23.04.
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In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in Whatley v. RTC,116 held that FIRREA
allows a pre-receivership claimant to "continue" an existing lawsuit
after RTC appointment without exhausting administrative reme-
dies." 7 Under this interpretation, in cases involving pre-receivership
claims, the RTC must take action-that is, exercise its ninety-day stay
optionn"8-to preserve its right to determine' claims administra-
tively.119 By requesting the ninety-day stay, the RTC delays the judi-
cial proceedings and may commence the administrative claims
procedures. If the RTC fails to do so, however, it loses its opportunity
to work within its administrative processes and the lawsuit continues.
The provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) set forth both the claims pro-
cess and the limitations on judicial review of claims under FIRREA.
Section 1821(d)(3) grants to the RTC, in its capacity as receiver, the
option to determine claims against it. This section requires prompt
notification to the creditors of the failed thrift of the RTC's appoint-
ment and of the date by which the creditors must file their claims for
administrative determination. 120 Section 1821(d)(5) requires the RTC
to notify a claimant within 180 days of its decision on the claim. 12'
The only specific requirement for determining a claim is that the RTC
"shall allow any claim received on or before the date specified in the
notice... which is proved to [its] satisfaction.' 12 Section (d)(5)(F)(ii)
states that the claimant is not prejudiced by filing a claim with the
RTC.1 2 3
Section 1821(d)(13)(D) states that no court shall have subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over any claim for either damages or injunctive relief
except as otherwise provided in the statute."2 4 Clearly, FIRREA vests
a court with subject matter jurisdiction over claims that have been
116. 32 F.3d 905 (5th Cir. 1994).
117. See id. at 910 (holding that the RTC may be deemed to have consented to
continue the litigation if it fails to request a stay in the proceedings).
118. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12)(A)(ii). This section of the statute allows the receiver
to request a ninety-day stay period in any judicial proceeding to which it becomes a
party as a result of being appointed receiver for a failed thrift.
119. Whatley, 32 F.3d at 910.
120. The statute requires the RTC to "promptly publish a notice to the depository
institution's creditors to present their claims, together with proof, to the receiver by a
date specified in the notice." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(B)(i).
121. Id § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i).
122. Id § 1821(d)(5)(B).
123. The statute provides, in relevant part, that "subject to paragraph (12), the ill-
ing of a claim with the receiver shall not prejudice any right of the claimant to con-
tinue any action which was filed before the appointment of the receiver." Id.
§ 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii).
124. Section 1821(d)(13)(D) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no court shall have jurisdic-
tion over-(i) any claim or action for payment from,or any action seeking a determi-
nation of rights with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for
which the Corporation has been appointed receiver, including assets which
the Corporation may acquire from itself as such receiver; or
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determined administratively.'2 The courts must determine whether
there are any other exceptions to § 1821(d)(13)(D) within the statute.
Many claimants rely upon § 1821(d)(6)(A) as the basis for their argu-
ment that FIRREA does not require pre-receivership claimants to ex-
haust administrative remedies prior to seeking a judicial resolution of
their claims. This section of the statute sets forth the claimants' right
to judicial determination of their claim. Section 1821(d)(6)(A) pro-
vides, in part, that
the claimant may request administrative review of the claim... or
file suit on such claim (or continue an action commenced before the
appointment of the receiver) in the district or territorial court of the
United States for the district within which the depository institu-
tion's principal place of business is located or the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia (and such court shall have
jurisdiction to hear such claim).'26
Much of the controversy surrounding the meaning of this statute re-
volves around the interpretation of the language within the parenthet-
icals of this section. The parenthetical language is the basis for the
argument that FIRREA provides additional options for pre-receiver-
ship claimants in litigation against the RTC. In particular, it has been
argued that pre-receivership claimants, unlike post-receivership claim-
ants, may continue their lawsuit without first having to enter the ad-
ministrative claims process.
The statute also provides the RTC with an optional ninety-day stay
period that allows the RTC to delay judicial proceedings whenever it
enters a lawsuit as a receiver.12 7 The Fifth Circuit relied upon this
provision to determine that the RTC may be held to have waived its
right to determine claims administratively.
Although in Coitl2 the Supreme Court rejected the exhaustion re-
quirement under the pre-FIRREA procedures, the requirement has
been upheld in cases where Congress explicitly establishes or intends
to make administrative remedies a condition to subject matter juris-
diction. 129 Thus, the question before any court in interpreting FIR-
REA is whether Congress made or intended the requirement. Both
the RTC and the Whatley court, while espousing opposing views, rely
(ii) any claim relating to any act or omission of such institution or the
Corporation as receiver.
Id. § 1821(d)(13)(D).
125. Id. § 1821(d)(6)(A).
126. Md § 1821(d)(6)(A) (emphasis added).
127. The statute provides, "[A]fter the appointment of a ... receiver for an insured
depository institution, the... receiver may request a stay for a period not to exceed
... (ii) 90 days... in any judicial action or proceeding to which such institution is or
becomes a party." Id § 1821(d)(12)(A)-(A) (ii).
128. 489 U.S. 561 (1989). For a discussion of Coit, see supra text accompanying
notes 85-114.
129. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1982).
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on the language of § 1821(d) and the general intent of Congress to
create a fair and efficient means of claims resolution to reach their
respective conclusions. This Note concludes that the language of the
statute supports the Whatley court's interpretation.
II. SEPARATE TREATMENT FOR PRE-RECEIVERSHIP CLAIMS?
In the administrative exhaustion cases, the circuit courts have dis-
agreed over whether pre-receivership claims should be treated differ-
ently from post-receivership claims.130 The majority of courts
conclude that all claimants are required to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking judicial determination of their claims. The
Fifth Circuit, however, has determined that pre-receivership claimants
are not required to exhaust administrative proceedings.
The Sixth Circuit and several state courts have also been forced to
determine whether § 1821(d) makes the pre- versus post-receivership
dichotomy relevant to the decision of whether under § 1821(d) there
is exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction. Courts deciding
whether FIRREA ousts state courts of subject matter jurisdiction over
pre-receivership claims have determined that FIRREA provides dif-
ferent options for pre- and post-receivership claimants. 1 1 In light of
the need for clarity and consistency in interpreting FIRREA, the stat-
ute ought to be interpreted as creating additional options for pre-re-
ceivership claimants that do not require the claimant to exhaust
administrative remedies.
A. Majority View
The majority of courts, in deciding that FIRREA does not provide a
separate claims resolution process for pre- and post-receivership
claims, stress the importance of a strict reading of § 1821(d)(13)(D)
that denies any court jurisdiction over claims involving the RTC ex-
cept as otherwise provided in the statute. 32 Under this interpretation,
courts are prohibited by the statute from taking any action with re-
spect to any claim against the RTC as receiver until the claimant has
complied with the administrative claims process. The reasoning be-
hind the majority's interpretation is best illustrated by those decisions
requiring exhaustion.
130. Compare RTC v. Mustang Partners, 946 F.2d 103, 106 (10th Cir. 1991) (con-
cluding that all claimants, both pre- and post-receivership, are required to exhaust
administrative remedies) with Whatley v. RTC, 32 F.3d 905, 907-09 (5th Cir. 1994)
(finding that the language of § 1821(d) indicates that pre- and post-receivership claim-
ants are to be treated differently).
131. See infra notes 172-221 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., RTC v. Mustang Partners, 946 F.2d 103, 106 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating
that the language of FIRREA requires each creditor to file a claim).
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In RTC v. Mustang Partners,133 the claimant argued that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment to the RTC. Mustang Part-
ners claimed that their lawsuit, which was pending against the failed
institution at the time of the RTC's appointment as receiver, provided
ample notice to the RTC and negated the requirement that they en-
gage in the administrative claims process." The district court con-
cluded that the claimants were required to exhaust administrative
remedies and that their failure to do so deprived the court of subject
matter jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's deci-
sion, noting that nothing in a "thorough reading" of FIRREA sup-
ported an interpretation that would dispense with the claims
procedures where a suit was filed pre-receivership. 3
In evaluating the claimant's arguments, the court focused on the
language of the statute. The Tenth Circuit found that
§ 1821(d)(3)(B)(i) "clearly requires that each creditor file a claim."''"
The court reasoned that this requirement was unchanged by the "con-
tinue" parenthetical of § 1821(d)(6)(A),1 37 which offers claimants who
followed the administrative claims process two options-to file an ac-
tion in court for the first time or to continue an action that had been
stayed during the administrative proceedings. 38 Mustang Partners
was denied the right to continue its pending lawsuit for failure to com-
ply with the FIRREA claims provisions because, according to the
court, neither option is available unless administrative remedies have
been exhausted. 39
In Brady Development Company v. RTC,40 the Fourth Circuit fol-
lowed the holding of Mustang Partners.1" ' In Brady, the Fourth Cir-
cuit rejected the argument that pre-receivership claimants were not
required to exhaust administrative remedies.' 4 2 The circuit court
found that Congress intended to place jurisdictional limits on the
power of the federal courts to review matters involving failed
thrifts.'4 3 According to the court, § 1821(d)(13)(D), in conjunction
with subparagraph (d)(6)(A), which grants jurisdiction in cases involv-
ing the RTC, established these limits. The court interpreted these sub-
sections as prohibiting federal courts from hearing claims until these
claims have been rejected by the RTC in the administrative claims
process or until the RTC has allowed its 180-day review period to
133. 946 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1991).
134. I& at 106.
135. Id.
136. Id
137. See supra text accompanying note 126.
138. See Mustang Partners, 946 F.2d at 106.
139. Id.
140. 14 F.3d 998 (4th Cir. 1994).
141. Id. at 1005.
142. Id. at 1005-06.
143. Id. at 1003.
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lapse without making a determination on a claim. Thus, only those
claims previously filed that have gone through the administrative re-
view process could continue after the review period expired. 144
In addition to its reliance on the language of the statute, the Brady
Development court credited the legislative history of FIRREA in
holding that all claimants must first submit their claims for administra-
tive review.145 The court stated that the legislative history of FIR-
REA indicated that the purpose of the exhaustion requirement was to
allow the RTC to resolve the bulk of claims against it quickly and
without further proceedings. 46 Thus, the court held that all creditors
must exhaust administrative remedies because allowing concurrent ju-
risdiction before exhaustion would defeat the purpose of the
procedures. 47
In both Mustang Partners and Brady Development, the claimants
argued that the jurisdictional bar in § 1821(d)(13)(D) 148 was inappli-
cable to pre-receivership claimants because applying it to pre-receiv-
ership claims would create a conflict with § 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii). 49
Section (d)(5)(F)(ii) provides that the filing of a claim with the re-
ceiver does not prejudice the right of the claimant to continue actions
filed prior to the RTC's appointment. 5 0 The court in Brady Develop-
ment interpreted this section of the statute to mean that a "pre-receiv-
ership claim is essentially tolled or suspended rather than fully
dismissed without prejudice during the administrative claims pro-
cess." 5 Thus, according to this interpretation, § 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii)
merely ensures a claimant's right to continue an action after the RTC
has exercised its optional ninety-day' 52 and mandatory 180-day 5 3 stay
periods under the administrative claims procedure.'5 4
144. IdL
145. ld at 1005 n.1.
146. Ild.
147. Id. at 1006; see Circle Indus. v. City Fed. Sav. Bank, 749 F. Supp. 447, 454
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("As is clearly indicated in the legislative history of FIRREA, Con-
gress intended that a district court not have subject matter jurisdiction of state law
claims ... until those claims are first presented to and adjudicated by the RTC...
(citation omitted)).
148. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D); see supra note 124 for text of this statute.
149. Mustang Partners, 946 F.2d at 106; Brady Dev. Co., 14 F.3d at 1002.
150. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii); see supra note 123 for the text of this statute.
151. Brady Dev. Co., 14 F.3d at 1004.
152. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12)(A)(ii).
153. Id. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i). This section states: "[B]efore the end of the 180-day
period beginning on the date any claim against a depository institution is filed with
the Corporation as receiver, the Corporation shall determine whether to allow or dis-
allow the claim and shall notify the claimant of any determination with respect to such
claim." Id.
154. See Brady Dev. Co., 14 F.3d at 1004-05.
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B. Minority View
The minority view argues that although "FIRREA contains no pro-
vision granting federal jurisdiction over claims filed after a receiver is
appointed but before administrative exhaustion,"'1 5 jurisdiction over
pre-receivership actions continues after appointment. Thus, pre-re-
ceivership claimants have two options upon the appointment of a re-
ceiver: to file a claim administratively or to continue with their
existing lawsuit.
In Whatley v. RTC,5 6 the plaintiff filed suit against Continental Sav-
ings for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and tortious inter-
ference with contractual relations.'57 One month later the RTC was
appointed conservator and substituted as party-defendant.", Six
months after that, the RTC was appointed receiver and filed pleadings
to reflect its capacity as receiver.15 9 The RTC did not request a stay in
proceedings under § 1821(d)(12)(A)(ii). 6° The RTC also failed to
meet its notice obligation under § 1821(d)(3)(C), which requires the
RTC to notify claimants either by publication or direct mail of its ap-
pointment. In fact, the RTC failed to communicate with the plaintiff
at all until it filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies.' 6 ' The district court granted the RTC's motion for
dismissal on the grounds that because the plaintiff failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 62
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, however, and held that
the claimant's failure to file an administrative claim with the RTC did
not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction over pre-receiver-
ship claims .163 According to the court, subject matter jurisdiction is
determined at the time of the filing of the complaint,16 and subse-
quent events cannot divest a court of its jurisdiction once it has been
properly invoked.' 65 Thus, where a claimant, prior to the appoint-
ment of the RTC, has filed a claim in a court that properly exercised
subject matter jurisdiction over the action, the appointment of the
RTC as receiver would not divest that court of jurisdiction.'"
Moreover, the court noted that several sections of FIRREA sup-
ported the finding that courts retained jurisdiction over pre-receiver-
155. Meliezer v. RTC, 952 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 1992).
156. 32 F.3d 905 (5th Cir. 1994).
157. Id at 906.
158. Id
159. Id
160. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12)(A)(ii); see supra note 127 for text of this statute.
161. Whatley, 32 F.3d at 907-08.
162. Id. at 908.
163. Id. at 910.
164. Id at 907.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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ship claims. 1 67 In particular, the court stated that § (d)(5)(F)(ii)-
which ensures the right of claimants to continue an action without
prejudice after the appointment of a receiver subject to a ninety-day
stay period 16 8 - offers an exception to the general provision denying
courts jurisdiction over claims involving the RTC.169 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit clearly recognized a different statutory scheme for post-receiv-
ership actions (over which there was no jurisdiction until the claims
procedures had been exhausted) 170 and pre-receivership actions (over
which the court may continue to assert jurisdiction).
Furthermore, the court found that a separate scheme for determin-
ing pre- and post-receivership claims did not, as the majority of courts
claimed, undermine the purposes of the administrative claims pro-
cess-efficiency and expediency. The Fifth Circuit stated that such a
system for determining claims protected the interests of creditors who
had "invoked the proper procedures for protecting their rights ...
[and had] expended time, money, and energy in properly asserting
their claims.'
7 1
C. Separating Pre- and Post-Receivership Claims in the Concurrent
Jurisdiction Issue
Cases addressing the issue of whether § 1821(d) requires adminis-
trative exhaustion are analogous to those deciding whether § 1821(d)
divests state courts of concurrent jurisdiction because, in both in-
stances, the RTC argues that FIRREA requires pre-receivership
claimants to follow the same procedures for claim resolution as other
claimants. In the concurrent jurisdiction cases, however, the courts
have unanimously rejected the RTC's reasoning, and their interpreta-
tion of the statute with respect to the concurrent jurisdiction issue is
instructive in determining whether FIRREA requires pre-receivership
claimants to exhaust remedies before proceeding judicially. The only
federal decision on the question of exclusive jurisdiction under FIR-
REA is Holmes Financial Associates v. RTC. 72
1. Interpreting Jurisdiction
Generally, unless Congress has specifically provided for exclusive
federal jurisdiction, state courts are presumed to have concurrent sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 73 The test currently used to determine
167. IM.
168. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii); see supra note 123 for the complete text of the
statute.
169. Whatley, 32 F.3d at 907.
170. Id. at 907 (citing Meliezer v. RTC, 952 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1992). "FIRREA
contains no provision granting federal jurisdiction to claims filed after a receiver is
appointed but before administrative exhaustion." Meliezer, 952 F.2d at 882.
171. Whatley, 32 F.3d at 908.
172. 33 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 1994).
173. Rosenblum, supra note 115, at 727-28.
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whether state court jurisdiction has been withdrawn was developed by
Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Tafflin v. Levitt. 74 Justice
Scalia stated that it "takes an affirmative act of power under the
Supremacy Clause to oust the States of jurisdiction."" This view was
adopted by the Court in Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly."6
The Court held that the absence of "language that expressly confines
jurisdiction to federal courts or ousts state courts of their presumptive
jurisdiction" is sufficient evidence that Congress did not intend to con-
fer exclusive federal jurisdiction.'" The Yellow Freight Court held
that in order to divest state courts of jurisdiction, Congress must do so
affirmatively within the text of the statute. 17 Thus, the critical issue in
deciding whether FIRREA vests the federal courts with exclusive ju-
risdiction is whether the language of FIRREA expressly denies juris-
diction to state courts.
Prior to 1994, no federal court had decided the question of exclusive
federal jurisdiction under FIRREA.179 In September 1994, the Sixth
Circuit became the first federal court to render a decision on this issue
in Holmes Financial Associates v. RTC. °80 The Sixth Circuit, following
the majority of prior state court decisions, 181 rejected the RTC's con-
tention that FIRREA grants exclusive federal jurisdiction in all cases
that involve the RTC.l"r Rather, it held that pre-receivership claim-
In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981), the Supreme Court
developed a three-prong test to determine whether the presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction is valid in a given case. First, the court must look to the statute to deter-
mine whether it explicitly requires exclusive federal jurisdiction. If exclusive federal
jurisdiction is not expressly required, then the court must determine whether it is
implied from clear and direct legislative history. The third prong of the test requires
the court to assess whether the statute would place federal and state interests in con-
flict. Id at 473. For a complete discussion of whether FIRREA provides for exclusivejurisdiction under this test, see Rosenblum, supra note 115, at 735-38.
174. 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
175. Id at 470.
176. 494 U.S. 820 (1990).
177. Id at 823.
178. Id.
179. Holmes Fn. Assoc. v. RTC, 33 F.3d 561, 562 (6th Cir. 1994).
180. Id. at 561.
181. Id at 567 n.6.
182. Id. at 567.
According to the Sixth Circuit's decision, the Florida Court of Appeals has been
the only court to decided in favor of the RTC's position that FIRREA grants exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction over all RTC litigation. Id. at 567 n.6. In FDIC v. Fleet Credit
Corp., 616 So. 2d 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), the Florida Court of Appeals held
that claims against a failed bank, after the RTC has been appointed receiver, "'must
be commenced or continued in United States District Court' " pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(6)(A). Id at 488-89 (quoting Department of Ins. v. FDIC, 610 So. 2d 695,
696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)). The Florida Court apparently relied on the reasoning
used to determine whether FIRREA requires pre-receivership claimants to exhaust
administrative remedies to decide this issue. Department of Insurance, 616 So. 2d 695
(Fla. Dist. CL App. 1992), held that the court could not exercise subject matter juris-
diction over a post-receivership claim because the statute requires that such claims,
once exhausted through the administrative claims process, be brought in federal
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ants had the additional option of continuing their lawsuit in state
court, placing the burden on the RTC to exercise its removal powers
to bring the case into federal court.
a. Language of the Statute
In Holmes, he RTC contended that FIRREA's jurisdictional limita-
tions divest state courts of concurrent jurisdiction both over future
actions in which the RTC will be involved in its capacity as receiver
and also over actions that are pending at the time of the RTC's ap-
pointment as receiver.183 The RTC based its interpretation on the lan-
guage of § 1821(d)(13)(D), 184 which states that, unless otherwise
provided, no court will have jurisdiction over any action against a
failed savings and loan for which the RTC is appointed receiver. The
RTC also relied on § 1821(d)(6)(A), which sets forth a claimant's op-
tions when bringing a claim against the RTC as receiver. 185 The RTC
argues that these sections, when read together, clearly rebut the pre-
sumption of concurrent jurisdiction." 6 According to the RTC, be-
cause § 1821(d)(6)(A) refers only to certain federal courts, and
because Congress did not expressly distinguish between pre- and post-
receivership actions, Congress intended the RTC's appointment as re-
ceiver to automatically divest state courts of jurisdiction. 187
The Sixth Circuit rejected the RTC's interpretation. Relying on the
test set forth in Taffin,'88 the court held that because FIRREA does
not expressly withdraw state court jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction
continues to exist over pre-receivership claims. 189 The court stated,
"[N]ot only does the plain language of the relevant statutes not 'af-
firmatively divest' states of their concurrent jurisdiction, it affirma-
tively permits state courts to continue to assert jurisdiction over cases
against the RTC which were filed prior to its appointment as
receiver."'190
The starting point for the circuit court's analysis was the language of
the same two sections of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) upon which the RTC
relied. 191 The RTC argued that because post-receivership actions
must be filed in federal court, where a claim has been filed in state
court. Id. at 696. While the Department of Insurance decision does not mention pre-
receivership claims, the reasoning in Fleet indicates that the Florida Courts do not
recognize any distinction between pre- and post-receivership claims in either context.
183. Holmes, 33 F.3d at 565.
184. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D); see supra note 124 for text of this statute.
185. Id § 1821(d)(6)(A); see supra text accompanying note 126.
186. Holmes, 33 F.3d at 566; Rosenblum, supra note 115, at 730.
187. Rosenblum, supra note 115, at 732.
188. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
189. Holmes, 33 F.3d at 569-70.
190. Id at 569.
191. These sections are 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) (text of the statute provided
supra in the text accompanying note 126) and § 1821(d)(13)(D) (text of the statute
provided supra note 124).
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court prior to the RTC's appointment as receiver, the claimant must
file for dismissal of the claim from state court and refile in federal
court after the RTC takeover."9' The Holmes court, however, inter-
preted this section to imply that pre-receivership actions could con-
tinue in state court and that, in pre-receivership actions only, state
courts were permitted to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.1 93
Courts considering the exclusive/concurrent jurisdiction issue under
FIRREA have generally rejected the RTC's interpretation because it
ignores the language to the contrary in the parentheticals of
§ 1821(d)(6)(A). 194 The first parenthetical provides that a claimant
may continue an action that was filed prior to the appointment of the
receiver.195 In Holmes, the RTC asserted that the term "continue"
was meant to apply only to those actions that had been properly filed
in the federal court specified in the statute.196 Most courts have dis-
agreed with this assertion and determined that this section permits
claimants to go forward with the case in state court.197
In Marc Development Inc. v. FDIC,198 for example, the court stated
that "[t]he term 'continue' implies that a party is proceeding forward
in an ongoing case without an interruption in the court's jurisdiction.
A claimant could not 'continue' an action over which the court had
been deprived of subject matter jurisdiction."'199 Other courts also
have rejected the RTC's interpretation, noting that if Congress had
intended for this parenthetical to require dismissal and refiling, it
would have provided some means for such a transition in the stat-
ute.2°° The Sixth Circuit in Holmes found that while the majority of
claimants against the RTC have only two options-either to request
an administrative review of the claim or to file suit in federal court for
a de novo review of the claim on the merits-pre-receivership claim-
ants have yet a third option 3m ' According to the court, "[Section]
1821(d)(6)(A)'s first parenthetical explains that... those who ha[ve)
192. Holmes, 33 F.3d at 566.
193. ld. at 567-68.
194. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A); see supra text accompanying note 126.
195. Holmes, 33 F.3d at 567-68.
196. Id. at 566-67. The statute specifies the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia or the district court in which the failed thrift's primary place of
business is located as having jurisdiction over cases involving the RTC or the FDIC as
a receiver. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A).
197. Holmes, 33 F3d at 566-67.
198. 771 F.Supp. 1163 (D. Utah 1991), vacated, 12 F.3d 948 (10th Cir. 1993).
199. Id. at 1168-69; see Rosenblum, supra note 115, at 731-32; accord Marquis v.
FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1152-54 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding that courts properly vested
with subject matter jurisdiction prior to RTC appointment as receiver are not divested
of that jurisdiction upon appointment); Guidry v. RTC, 790 F. Supp. 651, 654-56 (E.D.
La. 1992) (relying on the term "continue" in several sections of FIRREA to conclude
that FIRREA does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over pre-receivership claims).
200. Rosenblum, supra note 115, at 731 n. 33 and accompanying text.
201. Holmes, 33 F.3d at 567; Rosenblum, supra note 115, at 731.
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filed pre-receivership lawsuits... [in state court may] continue those
lawsuits. ' '202
The Holmes court further determined that if it accepted the RTC's
interpretation, it would render the second parenthetical, which grants
the courts specified in § 1821(d)(6)(A) jurisdiction to hear a case,
meaningless. The court reasoned that to state that the claim could
continue only in federal court would be redundant because 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(l)(1) already grants original federal jurisdiction.20 3 This stat-
ute gives the federal courts original jurisdiction over all cases in which
the RTC is a party.2 4 Thus, the court found that the only reading that
gave the parenthetical meaning was one that acknowledged concur-
rent jurisdiction over pre-receivership claims.
b. Permissive Nature of the RTC's Removal Power
The Sixth Circuit went on to buttress its conclusion by examining
other provisions in FIRREA that support concurrent jurisdiction over
pre-receivership claims. The court relied on § 1441a(l)(3) to conclude
that Congress had not granted exclusive federal jurisdiction in cases
where the RTC was the defendant/receiver. 0 5 This section allows the
RTC to remove any case in which it is involved as receiver to specified
federal courts-either the district court in D.C. or the district court in
the failed institution's primary place of business. 20 6 According to the
court, the permissive nature of the language indicates that if the RTC
chooses, it can litigate in state court. The court noted that if Congress
had intended to establish exclusive jurisdiction, it would have man-
dated removal, not made it permissive.207 This provision indicates
that Congress understood that the RTC would be a party to pre-re-
ceivership suits filed in state court and decided it was best to allow the
RTC to determine whether or not it wanted to continue in state
court.2 o8
202. Holmes, 33 F.3d at 567.
203. Id
204. Section 1441a(/)(1) states that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,
any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the [RTC] is a party shall be deemed to
arise under the laws of the United States, and the United States district courts shall
have original jurisdiction over such action, suit or proceeding," 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(/)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
205. Holmes, 33 F.3d at 568.
206. The statute provides that the RTC may remove any such action or proceeding
from state court to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or
the district court where the institution's principal place of business is located. 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(/)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
207. Holmes, 33 F.3d at 566-67.
208. Id at 567.
2338 [Vol. 63
LITIGATING AGAINST THE RTC
c. Ninety-Day Stay Provision
The court also relied on the ninety-day stay provision of
§ 1821(d)(12)20 9 as a further indication of Congress' intent to retain
both the state and federal court jurisdiction. The court reasoned that
if the state court did not have jurisdiction, then no stay could be pro-
vided. Moreover, it found that the purpose of the ninety-day stay was
to provide the RTC with a specific amount of time to choose whether
it would defend in state court or remove to federal court.210 Accord-
ing to the court, this interpretation is supported by the fact that the
RTC has the same ninety-day period to exercise a right of removal
under § 1441a(l)(3)(A)(i). 21'
d. "No Prejudice" Provision
Additionally, courts have relied on the "no prejudice" provision of
§ 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii)212 as evidence of Congress' intent to create a di-
chotomy between pre- and post-receivership claims. The Tenth Cir-
cuit in Marc Development v. FDIC21 3 read this paragraph as providing
a different procedure to be followed by litigants with pre-receivership
claims.21 4 The RTC's interpretation would have required dismissal of
a suit in state court and a subsequent refiling in federal court in order
to continue. As one court noted, "[W]hat could be more prejudicial
to a claimant's right 'to continue' a pending action than the outright
dismissal of the action? '215
e. Yellow Freight Test
Furthermore, while not specifically addressed in the decision, the
Holmes court noted unfavorably that the RTC had argued that be-
cause § 1821(d)(6)(A) only granted jurisdiction to certain federal
courts, state courts were divested of jurisdiction. 16 To accept the
RTC's argument would ignore the test set forth by the Supreme Court
in Tafflin v. Levitt2 7 and followed in Yellow Freight System, Inc v.
209. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12)(A) (providing that after its appointment as receiver,
the RTC may request a stay in the proceedings for a period of up to 90 days in any
action to which it becomes a party). For the language of the statute, see supra note
127.
210. Holmes, 33 F.3d at 568-69.
211. Id
212. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii). The statute provides that "the filing of a claim
with the receiver shall not prejudice any right of the claimant to continue any action
which was filed before the appointment of the receiver," subject to an optional 90-day
stay period invocable by the RTC. Id.
213. Marc Dev. v. FDIC, 771 F. Supp. 1163 (D. Utah 1991), vacated, 12 F.3d 948
(10th Cir. 1993).
214. Marc Dev., 771 F. Supp. at 1168.
215. Rosenblum, supra note 115, at 733 (quoting Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148,
1153 (1st Cir. 1992)).
216. Holmes, 33 F3d at 566.
217. 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990).
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Donnelly,218 which requires express statutory language depriving the
states of jurisdiction. Moreover, this interpretation fails to take into
account that "[i]t is black letter law.., that the mere grant of jurisdic-
tion to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from
concurrent jurisdiction over the cause of action. ' '219 Thus, Congress'
failure to expressly grant jurisdiction to state courts does not automat-
ically oust them of jurisdiction. 20 Consequently, Congress' failure to
expressly grant state court jurisdiction in FIRREA does not mean that
all claims against the RTC must be brought in federal court.
f. Congressional Intent
Moreover, a finding of exclusive federal jurisdiction would mean
that Congress ignored its objective of establishing a fair system for the
resolution of claims. If federal court jurisdiction were exclusive, a liti-
gant, wishing to protect her rights in the event that the RTC is ap-
pointed receiver before the resolution of the claim would be forced to
file in both state and federal court. The claimant would then have to
request a stay in federal court until she received a judgment in state
court. Other provisions within the statute clearly refute the notion
that Congress intended to create this obstacle to the resolution of pre-
receivership claims. For example, Congress provided the RTC with
liberal removal powers.2 1 These permissive removal powers indicate
that Congress recognized that pre-receivership claims would be pend-
ing in state courts at the time of the RTC's appointment and deter-
mined that it would be more efficient to permit the RTC to decide
whether to exercise this right of removal, rather than to require the
claimant to insure against all contingencies.
2. The Need for Clarity and Consistency
FIRREA has been described by various courts as some of the most
complex and poorly drafted legislation ever enacted.2z Thus, clarity
and consistency in interpretation are critical. Courts have clearly rec-
ognized that Congress intended to treat pre-receivership claimants
differently from other claimants in the concurrent jurisdiction context.
There is no indication from the language of § 1821(d) that Congress
meant for this dichotomy of claim schemes to be relevant only in cer-
tain contexts. Thus, this Note concludes that, to avoid further confu-
sion in the lower courts and among claimants, courts should interpret
218. 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990).
219. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 479 (1981).
220. See Rosenblum, supra note 115, at 732.
221. See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 206-09 on removal powers
under 12 U.S.C. § 1441a.
222. See, e.g., Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1992) (describing FIR-
REA as an "almost impenetratable thicket"); Guidry v. RTC, 790 F. Supp. 651, 653
(E.D. La. 1992) (stating that FIRREA "makes the Internal Revenue Code look like a
first grade primer").
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FIRREA as establishing a separate process for determining pre-re-
ceivership claims not only in the concurrent jurisdiction context, but
also in the exhaustion situation.
II[. Waiver of the Administrative Claims Process
A frequently litigated question in determining whether a court must
dismiss a claim against the RTC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
is whether the RTC may be held to have waived its right to determine
claims against it administratively. The majority of courts considering
this issue have determined that the RTC may not be deemed to have
waived its right to determine claims administratively and thereby have
consented to a court's subject matter jurisdiction.- The Fifth Circuit,
however, has held that where the RTC fails to take action to stay judi-
cial proceedings, it waives its right to administrative review.
This part concludes that the RTC may be deemed to have waived its
right to administrative review. This conclusion is consistent with the
interpretation of the language of other statutes requiring exhaustion
and with the Whatley court's ruling that FIRREA provides pre- and
post-receivership claimants with different options. Because under the
Whatley court interpretation FIRREA does not require exhaustion of
administrative remedies, however, courts following that holding will
rarely have the opportunity to address this issue. Where a court is
reluctant to base its decision solely on the pre- versus post-receiver-
ship distinction, however, the waiver theory provides the court with an
alternative means to allow a pre-receivership claimant to continue in
court without entering the administrative claims process.
Claimants have attempted to circumvent the exhaustion require-
ment by arguing that the RTC has waived the requirement and con-
sented to subject matter jurisdiction. For example, the plaintiff in
Bueford v. RTC2 claimed that the RTC's active participation in the
underlying lawsuit (e.g. filing various pre-trial motions) estopped it
from asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction.225 Bueford argued
that the RTC's actions indicated its consent to the district court's juris-
diction. 2 6 The court, however, rejected the claimant's waiver argu-
ment. According to the court in Bueford, because FIRREA imposes
an exhaustion requirement, but no means of waiving that require-
ment, the RTC's actions could not relieve the claimant from its obliga-
tion to comply with the administrative claims procedure. ' 7
223. See, e.g., Brady Dev. Co. v. RTC, 14 F.3d 998, 1007 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the doctrine of waiver does not apply to subject matter jurisdiction).
224. 991 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1993).
225. Id. at 485.
226. IM.
227. Id.
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In Brady Development Co. v. RTC,'z the RTC attended meetings
with pre-receivership claimants despite the fact that the claimants
failed to file an administrative claim within the ninety-day period.2 9
When the RTC met with the claimants, not only did it not inform
them that their claim was disallowed because of their failure to act
within the ninety-day period, but it agreed to an amended service of
process.2 30 After being involved in the case for over one year, the
RTC filed a motion for summary judgement on the grounds that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.231 The district court granted
the RTC's motion, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction under
§ 1821(d)(13)(D) 232 because the appellant failed to follow the admin-
istrative claims procedure.233 Most courts considering waiver argu-
ments have agreed with this conclusion.'
According to the majority view, black-letter law provides that either
the litigants or the court itself may properly assert lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction at any time during the proceedings. 235 Because the
court may raise the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction on its
own, "[p]arties can neither create nor destroy subject matter jurisdic-
tion"2 36 through private agreements or actions. Furthermore, under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may raise lack of subject
matter jurisdiction at anytime during the proceedings.237 Thus, it may
be argued that the RTC's actions cannot prevent it from later raising
the lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a defense.238
Where Congress has not given administrative procedures priority,
however, courts are not required to defer the exercise of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.3 9 The Fifth Circuit, in Whatley v. RTC,24 ° found that
under FIRREA, unless the RTC requests a stay in the judicial pro-
ceedings, it waives its right to determine pre-receivership claims ad-
ministratively. The Fifth Circuit's decision is based on the notion that
228. 14 F.3d 998 (4th Cir. 1994).
229. IM. at 1001-02.
230. Id. at 1002. The RTC also cooperated with the claimants to work out a secur-
ity agreement to facilitate the sale of land upon which the appellants had a lien. Id.
231. Il
232. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D); see supra note 124 for the language of this statute.
233. Brady, 14 F.3d at 1002.
234. See, e.g., Brady, 14 F.3d at 1006 (stating that the RTC's deposit of money to
substitute for real property that was under a notice of ls pendens could not prevent
the RTC from later asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a defense); Bueford
v. RTC, 991 F.2d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the claimant's waiver and estoppel
arguments because FIRREA the statute does not contain a waiver provision).
235. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss
the action.").
236. Brady, 14 F.3d at 1006.
237. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
238. Bueford, 991 F.2d at 485.
239. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 & n.4 (1982).
240. 32 F.3d 905 (5th Cir. 1994).
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FIRREA does not make exhaustion of administrative procedures the
exclusive remedy for claims against failed savings and loans. Accord-
ing to the court, "[C]ongress created a separate scheme for the han-
dling of pre-receivership actions, giving the receiver the privilege, but
not the duty, to request a stay of judicial proceedings so that it might
first consider the pending claim administratively."" The court, look-
ing to the language of the statute2 42 reasoned that Congress gave the
RTC the option to request a stay, but that request, or lack of request,
does not divest courts of jurisdiction;243 the stay would simply delay
the court proceedings because in a pre-receivership case, the court has
already been properly vested with subject matter jurisdiction.'" Thus,
according to the court, the RTC has two choices: to request a stay and
proceed administratively or to forego the stay and proceed
judicially.245
The Fifth Circuit's "plain language" interpretation focused on the
use of the word "may" in § 1821(d)(12)(A)(ii). 24 The court found
that the term "may" indicated that the provision was discretionary; it
neither indicated nor required an exclusive means of action. Further-
more, the term "shall" in other paragraphs247 supported a finding that
the use of administrative procedures was not mandatory.
The language in other federal statutes requiring exhaustion of ad-
ministrative procedures supports this interpretation. For example, in
the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"),2 Congress explicitly re-
quires claimants to submit their claims for agency review prior to a
court exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. The lan-
guage of the FTCA states: "[A]n action shall not be instituted upon a
claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss
of property... unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim
to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally
denied .... ,,249 Courts interpreting this statute have consistently up-
held the exhaustion requirement as a condition precedent to vesting a
court with subject matter jurisdiction. °50 Thus, it is a reasonable con-
241. Id. at 908.
242. Id- at 909.
243. I. at 908-09.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 164-66.
245. Whatley, 32 F.3d at 908-09.
246. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12)(A)(ii); see supra note 127 for the text of this statute.
247. Whatley, 32 F.3d at 909 & n.24.
248. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
250. See, e.g., Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274, 280 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that
the plaintiff was barred from claiming a meritorious defense due to her failure to
exhaust administrative remedies); Severtson v. United States, 806 F. Supp. 97, 98
(E.D. La. 1992) (stating that "[t]ort claims against the United States are forever
barred unless they are . . . first presented in writing to the appropriate federal
agency"); Ryan v. United States, 457 F. Supp. 400, 402 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (noting that
"it is well-settled that the filing of an administrative claim is a jurisdictional prerequi-
site to a federal suit").
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clusion that if Congress had intended to make exhaustion a prerequi-
site, it was well aware of how to make this requirement explicit within
the statute.
Also, according to the Whatley interpretation, absent a request for a
stay under § (d)(12)(A)(ii), no other provision of the subsection ex-
isted by which judicial proceedings could be stayed.25' The court de-
termined that if Congress had intended to make administrative review
an exclusive remedy it would have been simple to provide for an auto-
matic rather than a permissive stay.25 2 Thus, for failure to request a
stay within ninety days of appointment, the court held that the RTC
waived its right to resolve the claim administratively and consented to
jurisdiction.253
Furthermore, this determination supports and is consistent with the
Fifth Circuit's determination that § 1821(d) provides for different
treatment of pre- and post-receivership claims. In a pre-receivership
claim, the claimant has properly invoked a court's jurisdiction prior to
appointment, and the court continues to have jurisdiction after the
RTC's appointment.254 Thus, the RTC has the burden of acting to
stay the judicial proceedings. In a post-receivership claim, however,
the claimant must first comply with the administrative remedies pro-
cedures because no section of the statute vests a court with subject
matter jurisdiction over post-receivership claims until after adminis-
trative remedies have been exhausted. Unlike a pre-receivership
claimant, a post-receivership claimant does not have the additional
options provided by the "continue" parenthetical of § (d)(6)(A).25s
CONCLUSION
The power to administratively determine claims is one of the tools
Congress provided to the RTC and the FDIC to aid them in efficiently
resolving the savings and loan crisis. This grant of power, however, is
not without limits. The language of FIRREA clearly supports the
Fifth Circuit's determination in Whatley that Congress, aware of the
special circumstances facing pre-receivership claimants, made excep-
tions to the usual procedures for claim resolution. Among these is the
exclusion of pre-receivership claimants from the requirement of ex-
hausting administrative procedures. Furthermore, the purpose of
§ 1821(d) is to provide the RTC and the FDIC with an efficient and
effective means of resolving the massive number of claims against
failed savings and loans. The Fifth Circuit's approach avoids the inef-
251. Whatley, 32 F.3d at 909.
252. Whatley, 32 F.3d at 909 & n.26 (citing as an example 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1),
which imposes an automatic stay in the bankruptcy context).
253. Id at 910.
254. Idt at 908.
255. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A); see supra text accompanying note 126 for the lan-
guage of this statute.
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ficiency of requiring all pre-receivership claimants to halt ongoing liti-
gation to enter into the claims process, only to return to court when
the RTC rules against their claims. Moreover, requiring the RTC to
take advantage of its optional ninety-day stay period to evaluate the
claim and to decide whether it is willing to satisfy the claim or con-
tinue with the litigation saves claimants, as well as taxpayers, time and
money in resolving claims against failed thrifts.

